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ABSTRACT 
Hong Kong's 140-year history as a world trade centre and its 
formidable growth during this period have brought prosperity and 
recognition to an area initially summed up as a "barren rock". 
As the nucleus of trade in the Far East ^  Hong Kong‘s role 
as an entrepot has stimulated the development of a diverse range 
of industries. One of the most significant and progressive 
industries to have emerged is the containerised carriage of these 
goods f to the effect that Hong Kong now rates as the second 
busiest container port in the world• 
In 1971, the government actively decided to promote Hong 
Kong's shipping potential, ami subsequently developed the Kwrai 
Chung Container Port, in conjunction with the private sector, on 
a restricted section of Hong Kong's coastline. 
The first ship to arrive ^t the terminal tied up at Modern 
Terminals Limited (MTL) in September, 1972 and from humble 
beginnings - a itiere few thousand containers per year 申 the 
figures gradually increased to the present annual throughput in 
excess of 1.5 million TEU. 
With renewed confidence in its political and economic 
future, assured by the positive outcome of the Sino-British Joint 
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Declaration, Hong Kong's commercial activity, reflected in the 
Kwai Chung Port, has been consideralply boosted. Several 
developments have been initiated by the government and the major 
container operators to cope with anticipated expansion in 
container traffic. Chief among them were the announceiftent of the 
development of Terminals 8 and 9. 
MTL, being a company devoted to the futilre growth of Hong 
Kong, has committed itself to pursue its e>cpansion plan through 
bidding for the two future terminals, the former of which has 
been successfully won. It is because of this corporate plan that 
leads to the present study with an objective of investigating the 
marketing strategies for Terminals 8 and 9• 
The research is designed as a qualitative and exploratory 
study aiming at uncovering the important attributes leading to 
higher demand for terminal facilities, and hence increasing 
container throughput• The methodology chosen is personal 
interviews with marketing personnel in MTL and its shipping 
customers• 
The result of the study indicates that marketing efforts for 
Terminals 8 and 9 should be concentrated on maintaining the 
existing customers and market shares, increasing yard capacity, 
developing advanced information technology, and formulating 
cQHipetitive pricing and cost strategies. 
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However, attention should also be paid to control of the 
marketing plan during implementation, and various kinds of 
uncertainties arising from the dynamic situation in order to 
"craft" strategies for the best environment for success. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 History of the Hong Kong Container Port 
The reason for Hong Kong‘s existence is its seaport. 
Ships used to put in here for fresh water when Hong Kong 
was still a sparsely inhabited island in the Pearl River 
Delta, long before the British flag was raised in 1841 • 
Their eventual destination in those days was Guangzhou 
(Canton), China's door to the world and a magnet for trade 
and economic activity. 
China has undergone enormous changes since Hong Kong's 
establishment, sometimes traumatic, sometimes in the form 
of peaceful development and economic progress. Hong Kong's 
own economic growth throughout that period has essentially 
been a reflection of the fortunes of the land to the north. 
The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 
led to Hong Kong replacing Guangzhou as China's doorway, a 
role it still plays in terms of trade and shipping, even 
though the Chinese government decided 15 years ago to adopt 
an open door policy. Indeed, Hong Kong's China trade has 
grown and prospered to an even greater degree during that 
time. It is a role that the territory will surely continue 
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to play in the years after 1997, when it reverts to Chinese 
sovereignty and becomes a Special Administrative Region of 
China. 
Throughout its history, the adoption of modern working 
practices and technology is something at which Hong Kong 
has always excelled. This, allieci to a flexibility and a 
readiness to meet the demands of the market, has created 
the formula for its tremendous success. In the container 
handling industry, this was evident in 1967 when 
representatives of the shipping lines attempted to persuade 
the government that it was necessary to have a container 
terminal here. 
With private investment only, the container port has 
grown from the very first terminal, which was constructed 
and opened by Modern Terminals Limited (MTL” and received 
its first ship in 1972. Now the port has seven terminals, 
and demand has always compelled the terminal operators to 
constantly plan for the future, making sure they don't fall 
behind in catering for an ever-increasing volume of 
throughput^. 
1 It should be mentioned that the writer is currently an 
employee of Modern Terminals Limited (MTL) • The use of the words 
"we", "us", "our" and "ours" will refer to MTL. 
2 "Throughput" refers to the volume of containers handled 
in the container terminals or container ports. 
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Ifg Present ODerations in the Part. 
In 1991 the Port of Hong Kong handled approximately 
6‘2 million TEU (Twenty Foot Equivalent Units)% an 
increase of 21 per cent on the 1990 figure of 5.1 million 
TEU. This compares with a 15 per cent growth in 1990. So 
the graph in Figure 1 is still moving upwards, in line with 
the pace of industrialisation in South China. Container 
port development is presently planned on the basis of a X4 
per cent growth per annum*, which is the average that has 
been sustained annually for the past ten years. if the 
same growth rate continues, its compound effect will 
require Hong Kong to bring an additional container berth 
into operation every six months. 
The H6ng Kong Container Port was built and has been 
operated by private enterprise throughout its short 
history. It currently has seven terminals operated by 
Modern Terminals Limited (MTL), Hongkong International 
Terminals Limited (HIT) and Sealand Orient Limited 
(Figure 2). In fact, the government has seen its operation 
and expansion as a source of income for the public coffers, 
replenished constantly by the premiums the operators pay. 
3 "TEU" (Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit) is internationally 
adopted as a measurement unit for container throughput. A twenty 
foot long container is counted as one TEU, while a forty foot 
long container as two TEU. 
4 Crichton, John. "Port Development : Hong Kong Style", 
CONTAINERISATION INTERNATIONAL HONG KONG, December 1991, P.73. 
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Year Kwax Chung * Mid-Stream Total 
# 1990 3.83 1.27 5.10 
1991 4,37 1,45 5.82 
~ 1992 4.98 X.65 6.63 
1993 5.67 1.88 7.55 
1994 6.47 2.14 8.61 
1995 7.37 2.45 9.82 
X996 8.41 2.79 11.20 
1997 9.58 3.18 12.76 
1998 10.92 3.62 14.54 
1999 12.45 4-13 16.58 
2000 14.20 4.71 18.91 
Note: All figures are in million TEUs 
* Mid-Stream means the containers handled at mooring buoys 
or from ships at anchor 
# Actual figures 
- 1 9 9 2 and beyond estimated at a 14% growth per year, 
starting with the actual figure for 199X 
Figure 1 • CONTAINER THROUGHPUT GROWTH IN HONG _ G 
_ A N P AT 14% 
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In Hong Kong, the terminal operators, being 
private enterprises, must make a profit for their 
shareholders as well as meet the government's requirements. 
This stands in contrast with many ports throughout the 
world which are goverranent-owned and operated, including 
those often referred to as Hong Kong's rivals: Singapore, 
Kaohsiung (Taiwan) and the ports in Southern China. 
This situation, when considered in light of the poor 
financial shape of the shipping industry at present, seems 
to put the terminal operators in a tight corner. They must 
justify their charges when they are compared with ports 
that are operating on land which was originally governments-
owned and which cost nothing to acquire. They must ensure 
a return for their shareholders through keenly-negotiated 
fees, whereas the others often operate under different 
financial guidelines. They must also recruit their labour 
in a tight and expensive labour market. 
The fact that the Port of Hong Kong has grown and 
prospered in these conditions is a source of pride for MTL 
and the other operators. But it isn't a source of 
complacency in today's ruthlessly competitive world. 
1 FuHi^ re Expansion 
As the throughput continues to rise to the limits that 
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the present facilities can handle, personnel in the field 
have requested the government to make fresh areas available 
for expansion. 
In early 1991 the government announced that Terminal 
8 on Stonecutters Island would be allocated by private 
treaty agreement. Its development is being undertaken 
jointly by MTL and COSCO/HIT, the latter being a joint 
venture between Hongkong International Terminals and the 
China Ocean Shipping Company of the PRC. The first berth 
will come onstream in August 1993. When completed Terminal 
8 will consist of four berths, two of which will be owned 
and operated by MTL and two by COSCO/HIT. 
To the operators it seems a matter of natural 
progression that Mainland firms become investors and co-
developers of the Container Port in Hong Kong. Chinese 
companies are already major users and operators of the 
port. In 1997 Hong Kong reverts to Chinese sovereignty, 
and will become a "Chinese port" in the fullest sense. HIT 
has a joint venture with China Ocean Shipping Company 
(COSCO) in the Terminal 8 project, and MTL has just got the 
largest PRC company in Hong Kong, China Merchants Holdings 
Company Limited, to participate as a shareholder in Modern 
Terminals Limited in April 1992. 
At a growth rate of 14 per c^nt per annum, the 
additional 1.8 million TEU per annum capacity of Terminal 
8 
8 will suffice only until 1995• Then MTI. will be looking 
for the development of a ninth Terminal, also comprising 
four berths and. of similar capacity. This terminal has 
already been triggered, and civil engineering studies by 
the government have been completed for it to be sited on 
the southeast coast of Tsing Yi Island. 
However, Terminals 8 and 9 were triggered based on an 
annual growth rate of 14 per cent. If the annual growth 
rate slows down to 8 per cent - slightly more than half the 
present figure _ Terminal ^ and even Terminal 8 would have 
a chance of becoming excess. Something has to be pt^epared 
for the worst. A sound strategic marketing plan for the 
new facilities is vital for the future success of the 
company• 
1.4 Regional and Local Competition 
Apart from the domestic sector, MTL has to be aware of 
the international environment as well. Other ports in the 
y region are not standing by while these developments take 
� 
place. Considerable development is being undertaken by 
Singapore, which has overtaken Hong Kong as the world's 
lousiest port in terms of the number of containers being 
handled since 1990. The Singapore government is already in 
the process of building a new container port. Forceful and 
clever marketing extols the Singapore Container Port's 
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benefits, particularly its location as a transhipment 
centre, and its attractive tariffs. Although a closer 
examination of their charges reveals a lot of hidden 
extras, most of which are incorporatec^ in the standard 
tariffs in Hong Kong, shippers and shipping lines are 
likely to be attracted by the superficial benefits, 
Taiwan has also embarked on an expansion programme. 
Its largest port, Kaohsiung, is constructing the remaining 
three berths of its 8--berth terminal 4, and Keelung and 
TaiChung are both being upgraded in size and facilities. 
The pace of modernisation in China has led to similar 
development of port facilities along its coastline• These 
are now increasingly being undertaken by a mixture of 
direct government or government corporation and foreign 
investment• 
HTL's response to its competitors depends upon which 
ports we are talking about. Singapore atid Hong Kong cannot 
really be regarded as direct competitors because of their 
locations and the markets which they serve. Singapore 
specialises in transhipment serving Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand and the Indian subcontinent, whereas Hong Kong's 
main focus is upon its own import/export market and China 
transhipment• 
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When we examine the port developments in China, the 
position is somewhat more complex. China has burgeoning 
industry, especially in the Pearl River Delta area. More 
and more Hong Kong manufacturers are relocating their 
factories there, creating an increasing flow of raw 
materials and finished products between Hong Kong and 
Southern China. 
Rather than undertake expensive port construction 
which would operate in competition to Hong Kong, MTL 
believes the Pearl River basin； and indeed Southern China, 
would be better served by improving their transport, 
communications and electric power infrastructure, allowing 
them to continue to use the efficient and competitive 
container port facilities in Hong Kong, already in place 
and sustained by private enterprise• 
In speaking of Hong Kong Container Port's future role, 
it is worth mentioning that the composition of our 
throughput is changing. Emphasis is moving towards Inter-
Asia trade, and away from a dependency on US exports • US 
trade used to account for 40 per cent of our throughput. 
Now it is down to 35 per cent, whilst Inter-Asia traffic 
has increased from 22 to 29 per cent. We are therefore 
seeing the development of a better balance of trade with 
various regions of the world, with 嫌 of course - an 
increasing element of China trade. MTI/s projections 
indicate that by 1997 Hong Kong will actually be handling 
� 
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more shipping for China than for Hong Kong itself. 
A source of competition which does concern the 
terminal operators in Kwai Chung is that of the "midstream 
o p e r a t o r s w h o load and discharge cargo offshore. The 
terminal operators have jointly submitted papers to, and 
had discussions with the Port Development BoarcT, which is 
the government‘s advisory body, on the relationships 
between the terminal operators and them, within the 
industry. While the terminal operators believe competition 
between all types of cargo handlers is healthy for its 
development, they believe this competition should be 
economically on a level playing field. 
It seems manifestly unfair to the terminal operators 
that they have to pay high premiums for the resources they 
use, while the midstream operators do not. As a result, 
the midstream operators are able to charge far lower 
tariffs, in line with their smaller overheads. This will 
not encourage the terminal operators, or anyone else, to 
make the large investment needed for the port's further 
development. 
5 "Midstream operators" are those small companies which 
operate barges and lighters for loading and unloading containers 
from the container vessels in the middle of the sea using moor 
or anchorage but not proper berth or terminal. 
6 The Port Development Board (PDB) is a non稱statutory 
government body established in April 1990 for assessing port 
development needs, recommending strategies, coordinating 
government and private sector planning and acting as listening 
post for the views of interested parties. 
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There are other problems that need to be ironed out. 
Our viability as an entrepot for China hinges upon the 
sitiQoth flow of containers into and out of China. At 
present there is congestion at the border crossings. The 
main reasons for this are the rules imposed by the Chinese 
authorities. For example, containers leaving China must 
exit at the same crossing point by which they arrived. 
This creates many unproductive moves and considerable 
planning problems. Ways must be found to create greater 
flexibility to allow more containers to be transported 
across the border by barges and other maritime craft, which 
would be more environmentally-friendly, and cheaper and 
would help to relieve congestion. If the problems are not 
solved, delays and congestion will increase, pushing up 
costs and deterring customers from using the Port of Hong 
Kong. 
To retain its leading edge, the Hong Kong Container 
Port must succeed in keeping its costs und^r control. It 
must increase its productivity. It must constantly update 
its technology, by example through the introduction of more 
extensive electronic data interchange (EDir and other 
automation to keep the workload ana operating expenses 
down. Most important, a practical marketing plan for the 
future growth of the company is vital in leading MTL 
through the coming decades to success• 
7 Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is a communication 
system whereby any message is transmitted, from one party to 
another party by electronic means. 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
2,1 Background and Overview 
MTL is one of the three container terminal operators 
iti Hong Kong, with 20 years of history and 1,850 employees 
at present. It occupies three terminals out of the total 
seven in the Kwai Chung Container Port. In 1991 MTL 
handled a throughput of 1.57 million TEUs, which was 
already an over-stressed figure compared to the limited 
capacity it has. Its throughput volume accounted for about 
35% of the market share while it had only about 28% of the 
facility in the port (Figure 3). 
1991 saw an even greater percentage of growth in 
business than the year before. MTL has experienced over 
14% growth last year. Demand for services is much higher 
than capacity available. 
MTL has adopted a long term expansion plan based on 
the existing growth rate. It acquired in March 1991 the 
operational right of half of the four-berth Terminal 8 
which will be coming on stream in September 1993. It has 
14 
Capacity Share Market Share 
Year — 
MTL HIT SEALAND MTL HIT SEALAND 
1986 33% 51% 16% 40% 45% 14% 
1987 33% 51% 16% 41% 45% 14% 
1988 35% 50% 16% 42% 44% 14% 
1989 37% 51% 11% 38% 48% 14% 
X990 28% 63% 9% 36% 50% 14% 
1991 28% 63% 9% 35% 54% 11% 
•1992 28% 63% 9% 32% 58% 10% 
1993 30% 62% 8% 30% 61% 9% 
1994 30% 62% 8% 30% 62% 8% 
1995 33% 6X% 7% 31% 62% 7% 
1996 33% 61% 7% 33% 61% 7% 
1997 33% 61% 7% 33% 61% 7% 
) 
* Figure for 1992 and thereafter are estimated 
Figure 3. CAPAC工TY SHARE AND MARKKT gttARE 
TW KWAI CHUNG PORT 
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also made a firm decision that it will bid for Terminal 9 
which is scheduled to be operational in mid 1995. 
This long term policy is formulated on the assumption 
of a two digit growth rate. Some scenarios - a growth rate 
of 14%, or a lower figure of 8%, or a still lower figure of 
6% - can be investigated. Whatever happens, MTL has to 
"craft" a range of strategies on how to market the services 
supplied by the future new terminals• 
It is the aim of this project to study the likelihood 
of various scenarios and identify appropriate marketing 
strategies for Terminals 8 and 9 in the future. 
2-2 Research Objectives 
The specific research objectives of the current study 
are:-
(i) to review the present coimnercial strategies 
of MTL, 
(ii) to analyze the overall market, 
(iii) to project the anticipated demand and supply 
of the container business in the future, 
(iv) to determine the major problem areas faced 
by MTL, 
(V) to access MTI/s potential in providing 
services in the future, and 
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(vi) to develop marketing strategies for 
Terminals 8 and 9• 
2.3 The Belief 
The container handling business in Hong Kong is of a 
unique nature. The market is a kind of oligopoly, in which 
there are only three privately-run terminal operators 
dominating the "supply" side. They are MTL, HIT and 
Sealand. 
MTL is the earliest established terminal operator in 
Hong Kong, which ran the first container terminal in 1972. 
It is a private company with eight shareholders holding its 
stakes. Currently it possesses three terminals in the Kwai 
Chung Container Port. These are Terminal Ij Terminal 2 and 
Terminal 5. 
HIT has become the biggest player in the field since 
it successfully bid for Terminal 7 in 1988. The winning 
bid enabled HIT to acquire an additional 31-5 hectares of 
capacity®. HIT at present owns Terminal 4, Terminal 6 and 
Terminal 7, the latter two have sizes doubling the older 
terminals in Kwai Chung. HIT is also a private local 
company, with its majority of shares controlled by 
e Thompson, Kakoli. "Container Terminals: HIT 'S Winning 
Bid Will Change Face of Kwai Chung", ASIAN FINANCE (HONG KONG), 
Vol: 14, iss: 5, P. 32-34, May 15, 1988. 
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Hutchison Whampao Ltd. 
Sealand is the smallest terminal operator in Kwai 
Chung, which owns only Terminal 3. Being an American 
shipping company operating a dedicated terminal, Sealand 
only handles vessels of its own company, unlike MTL and HIT 
which are multi-users terminals. 
While Sealand operates one berth mainly for its own 
use, MTL ana HIT both run common-user terminals. These 
two multi-user terminal operators do compete commercially 
but not in a major way. On the contrary they are 
cooperative with each other in some ways. They never enter 
into price wars, nor do they poach each others' customers• 
On the •"demand" side, the uniqueness is that ther6 is 
only a handful of customer shipping lines. This small 
number of customers can -- it is held 一 be better served 
by personal contacts than any sophisticated advertising and 
promotional tactics. This, plus the fact that demand has 
long exceeded supply, means that no comprehensive marketing 
strategies have been devised in the past. 
However, with the concept of "quality service" being 
much in the forefront of thinking today, and the market 
environment changing dramatically day by day, it seems 
evident that planning marketing strategies is vital to the 
future growth of the business. This study is therefore 
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based on a belief that marketing environmental changes are 
dramatic and here to stay, and that keener competitive 
strategising than before is required in order to grab more 
business, 
2.4 Significance of the Research 
This research centres on shipping companies and seeks 
to assess, perhaps for the first time/ the attitudes of 
customers in that industry. Specifically, it will delve 
into the many factors affecting customer acceptance of 
MTL's services. 
Through the research, it is one of the objectives also 
to lay the groundwork for further study on specific 
marketing tactics, such as pricing^ which could be more 
quantitative in nature. As it stands, this study can 
become a benchmark for more comprehensive follow-up work 
into specific areas of interest• 
2.5 Research Methodology 
As stated before, this research aims at developing the 
marketing strategies for the future container terminal 
facilities. 
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Due to the fact that marketing strategies of this 
unique industry are oriented chiefly at the customer 
requirements and attitudes, and that the number of 
customers is quite limited/ qualitative research was 
conducted• 
2.5,31 Pergonal. Ipt^rvi^yg 
In general, the qualitative method of personal 
interviews is less structured and more intensive than the 
standard questionnaire-based (quantitative) interview 
approach, as it requires a longer, more flexible 
relationship with the respondents to get information that 
has real depth and richness. 
Because the customjer base is so small, no sampling 
plan for conducting interviews was required. The author 
just interviewed all the chief customers of MTL (Appendix 
A) with an annual revenue over 40,000 TEU to find out their 
requirements relative to the terminal services and their 
definitions of quality services. 
Further important interviews were those involving 
personnel in the marketing and operations departments in 
MTL (Appendix B)• 
I 香 港 中 文 大 學 圖 書 狩 藏 嘗 
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It is from them that the author obtained insights into 
the future business growth trend, the potential of the 
company and the likely developments of MTL/s major 
customers. They have a good grasp of the matter through 
their visits to the overseas headquarters of the shipping 
lines several times a year. (It should be noted that the 
local representatives of these lines may just be 
operational agents who are not much involved in the realm 
of marketing.) 
2,5.2 Literature Survey 
Apart from personal interviews, a literature survey of 
the past ten years was conducted to cover most of the 
salient points concerning the subject. 
The research was based on the ABI package on CDROM 
(Compact Disk Memory) from UMI (University Microfilms 
International), which specializes in booH and article 
abstracts, and which is installed in the University Library 
of the Chinese University of Hohg Kong, The author also 
utilized the information library in MTL's Public Relations 
Section. The materials include newspaper clippings, books 
and magazine articles. 
The objective of this survey was to uncover works 
concerning contain^f handling services' particular those in 
21 
Hong Kong, and the development of technical operational 
systems in the world in recent years. 
The results of this literature survey will be 




As a result of a literature search using the ABI 
package as well as standard library search techniques, not 
many articles and books on the marketing strategies for the 
container terminal business were found. Rather there are 
many articles and news clippings written on the shipping 
lines^ requirements, local throughput projections and 
future container terminals development. This is probably 
because container terminal operations is a business of 
unique nature and it involves only a few operators in the 
world. This is coupled with the fact that most of the 
container ports in other countries are government-owned, 
unlike the one in Hong Kong. Therefore few might bother to 
explore the marketing strategies for these national ports 
to which competitive elements might not apply. 
3 - 1 T e r m i n a l Capacity 
Many line representatives have expressed their worries 
over running out of terminal capacity in Hong Kong. Mr. 
Terence Sit, Chairman of the HongKong Liner Association has 
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urged the government to ensure that port development keep 
us with cargo increases、 He suggested that the government 
look at the whole supply and demand situation, and warned 
that Hong Kong was seeing increased competition from other 
ports in the region like Kaohsiung in Taiwan and in the 
near future from the neighbouring ports like Shekou, Chi 
Wan and Yantian in China, which have ambitious expansion 
plans (Figure 4). Lines would be forced to move to these 
ports if Hong Kong is not able to cope with the demand. 
3.2 Huge rise in Future Throughput 
Personnel in the shipping industry all foresee a huge 
rise in throughput for the coming decade. Maersk Line, 
MTI/s major customer, which handles about 25 of the Far 
East trade worldwide, regarded 1991 as a better year than 
1990 because the market to Europe is extremely strong, and 
it expects the trans-Pacific market to improve, even though 
the Unitea Stated is still in recession. The General 
Manager of the Transport Department of China Merchant 
Holdings, Mr. Zhu Dashou is optimistic about future 
prospects for Hong Kong,s port industryio. 
9 Wong, Joon San. "Terminal Capacity Worries Liner 
Chief", SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, F&SP P. 1, July 19, 1991. 
10 "High Growth Rate of Container Throughput in 1991", 
SING TAO JIH PAO, January 17, 1992. 
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3.3 Handling Efficiency 
A reporter of The Journal of Commerce, Mark Magnier, 
when made a comparison between th^ world's number one and 
number two ports 一一 Singapore and Hong Kong, emphasized 
that the efficiency has been an especially effective 
marketing tool for container terminals in recent years^^. 
The government‘s determination in boosting up the 
efficiency through regulations is one of the reasons why 
Singapore has overridden Hong Kong in the past two years. 
Apart from the government's legislative and financial 
assistance, Singapore is also strengthening its EDI links 
with various business parties. Its function as a 
distribution hub has been aided by the speed and simplicity 
with which inbound and outbound consignments can be cleared 
more and more quickly because of the rapidly growing EDI 
links with overseas ports and emerging cargo community 
systems in other parts of the world"^^. 
While Hiroshi Takahashi, Senior Managing Director of 
th6 Japanese shipping line NYK, still calls Hong Kong "the 
most efficient port in Asia" despite its congestion, the 
Executive Vice President of Korea's Hanjin Shipping Co. 
Maqnier, Mark. "Major Shipping Lines See Nation As 
Vital Link to Asian Trade", THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, December 
1991. 
x2 Cox, Nick. "Singapore Plans Further Boost to 
infrastructure"', CARGONEWS ASIA, November 11, 1991 • 
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Ltd. has remarked that Hong Kong is getting worse and 
worse. Vessels have to wait one or two days and it is 50% 
more expensive than Taiwan. Hanjin is keen to develop 
dedicated facilities at Kaohsiung, while Maersk is 
expanding its Kaohsiung terminal with a view to switching 
some of its Hong Kong calls to Taiwan". 
Gary Gilbert, Vice-president Central Asia of Sea-LancJ 
Service, has also recognised the rising deitiand for quality 
services. Efficient container terminals, accurate and 
timely documentation and electronically distributed 
information are required to meet the needs of the shipping 
companies^'*, 
3-4 'Tariff 
Shipping representatives in Hong Kong have long been 
expressing their dissatisfaction with the terminal tariffs 
of the local container port. Due to their low profit 
margins, the "high*' tariff as they consider, puts much 
pressure on the shipping coiapanies^^. They worry that this 
issue will have a negative impact on the local container 
13 f. Twin Peaks - The Next Episode", PORT DEVELOPMENT 
INTERNATIONAL, November 1991, 
14 Wong, Joon San‘ "Improved Service aim of New Group", 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, March 6, 1992• 
"Pressure on Shipping Lines by Tariff Adjustment Eaqh 
Year", CARGO NEWSLETTER, October 1991. 
27 
terminal business cause the lines will try to shift their 
business to other ports in the region^^. The Managing 
Director (Hong Kong, Macau and China Trade) of American 
President Line, Richard Hiller, has already announced his 
plan to use other ports of lower operation costs such as 
Guangdong in China to replace Hong Kong^^ • 
3,5 New Threats 
More and more threats have been arising recently to 
Hong Kong's container terminal business. Besides Singapore 
and Kaohsiung, the world is watching the progress of the 
developments in SheKou and Yantian, two new ports springing 
up around the Pearl River Delta of China, which have 
attracted international attention from the maritime 
Goitiitiunity due to their ambitious scale and capital 
investment size^®. These ports are seen by some analysts 
as a threat to Hong Kong's pre-eminent port status. Faced 
with the over-capacity pressure in the container handling 
facilities here, even some shippers say they would consider 
going north. 
16 "Shipping Industries Worries about High Tariffs", SING 
TAO vTIH PAO, November 5, 1991. 
17 "ATL Plans to Use Guangdong Ports to Replace Hong 
Kong", ORIENTAL DAILY NEWS, March 5, 1992. 
x8 "Hong Kong Faces New Threat", LLOYD'S LIST, October 31, 
1991. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESENT MARKETING STRATEGIES 
The coitution goal of any commercial institution is 
basically oriented towards profit making. Being a private 
company, MTL also adopts a set of marKeting strategies 
aiming at maximizing profit for the shareholders. 
4-1 Mission. Goals and Objectives 
Before going into the present marketing strategies, it 
is helpful to look at MTL's mission- goals and ojDjectives 
first. 
The mission of MTL can be summed up in the following 
statement:-
"MTL is answerable to the Board and its shareholders 
whose expectation of MTL is to be a profitable and 
effective organisation•“ 
In order to accomplish the mission, MTL has identified 
its overall goals and objectives as t>elow:-
⑴ to achieve an acceptable return on 
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investment； 
(ii) to maintain a significant market share, but 
not at all costs； 
(iii) to provide high quality service as 
recognized by customers and peers in the 
industry； 
(iv) to be a good employer, offering quality 
working conditions; and 
(V) to be a good corporate citizen and a 
responsible member of Kwai Chung and. the 
Port Community. 
The overall goals and objectives of MTL are clearly 
defined. The strategies presently adopted to achieve these 
goals and objectives are incorporated in the strategic 
plan. 
4.2 Strategic Plan 
The management of MTL has identified, through the 
strategic planning process, four key result areas in which 
long-term plans and strategic alternatives need to be 
evaluated:-
(i) service quality 
(ii) tariff policy 
(iii) cost structure 
(iv) human resources 
32 
Marketing strategy will mainly concentrate on the 
areas of service quality and tariff policy, but to a 
certain degree, all these four key result areas will be 
covered. 
4.3 Marketing Strategy Review 
With the goals, objectives and key result ^reas in 
mind, let us evaluate and review the marketing strategies 
currently adopted by MTL. 
4,3.1 Service Quality 
To provide high quality service is one of MTL's 
objectives. The present strategy is to enhance customer 
services in order to maintain the existing customer base. 
Since the operating capacity of MTL is almost saturated at 
present, new customers cannot be entertained. With the 
projected growth of existing business, MTL's facilities 
will be fully occupied in 1992. If the completion of the 
fijrst berth of Terminal 8 is on schedule, the over-capacity 
situation can be eased in late 1993, Even with the promise 
of Terminal 8, it must be carefully considered whether or 
not shipping lines can tolerate the present service level. 
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It is quite difficult to define what quality service 
is. Basically, the service level must be acceptable to 
both shipping lines and MTL. To shipping lines, improving 
the turnaround time and mniinizing the berthing delay time 
is the service standard. To provide additional features 
such as berthing priorities, fixed day schedule berthing, 
and to increase productivity will be the means of improving 
service quality. To MTL, improving service level doesn't 
necessarily mean that extra costs are incurred. If MTL can 
increase productivity and reduce the berthing delay time, 
more boxes can be handled and more income generated in 
return• Of course, the marginal revenue and the marginal 
cost must be weighed, and the constraint of operating 
capacity, both quay side and land side, must be evaluated• 
In order to maintain the customer base and to enhance 
the service level, MTL has undertaken the following 
measures:-
(i) Additional facilities 
In the long run, MTL must provide sufficient 
facilities to its customers. With the 
granting of development rights to Terminal 
8 West, two additional berths of 900,000 TEU 
capacity will be available in late 1993. 
m h will therefore be able to keep demand 
and supply in balance. Based on the 
throughput projection in Appendix C and 
Figure 4, and the estimated capacity 
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utilization in Figure 5, Terminal 8 will be 
saturated in 1996• Therefore, there must be 
firm plans for the development of Terminal 
9; otherwise MTL will be exposed to the 
threat of loss of business. 
(ii) Operation efficiency 
In the short run, MTL must improve its 
operation efficiency so that more ships and 
more boxes can be handled with the existing 
facilities. Quay crane no. 12 was ordered 
and delivered in response to customer 
demands for fixed ciay schedules in the 
weekends. 
In addition, MTL has studied the method of 
increasing productivity and reducing costs. 
The change of operation mode in Terminal 8 
is one of the obvious examples. In 
Terminals 1, 2 and 5, a mixed operation of 
transfer cranes, straddle carriers, and 
forklifts has been adopted, and in Terminal 
8t a rubber-tyred gantry crane has been 
selected as the operation mode with the aim 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Automation is also one of the measures to 
improve operation efficiency and provide 
additional feature to shipping line^. Two 
computer systems MOTLYS (MTL Yard System) 
and MOTCOF (MTL Container Freight Station 
System) have been used for a long time 
(since 1982), and the computerized ship 
planning and yard planning systems are under 
study with the aim of improving the overall 
efficiency of the work procedures. The 
development of EDI can be regarded as 
advanced technology that will facilitate 
customers, such as Maersk and Zim Line in 
their own operations. 
(iv) Overflow facilities 
Overflow is the last resort that MTL can use 
if in the short run it cannot increase 
capacity in line with demand. However, it 
will be more difficult for shipping lines to 
tolerate the service level, especially the 
mid-stream operation. If MTL has to use 
facilities of HIT or Sealand, it will not be 
profitable for MTL since it will incur a 
higher cost than working in MTL itself. 
Therefore, overflow can only be regarded as 
a temporary measure. 
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4,3.2 Tariff Policy 
The tariff policy of MTL can be regarded as the 
pricing strategy to achieve a reasonable return on 
investment. MTL's existing tariff system is a benchmark 
tariff, i.e. standard tariff for all shipping lines 
irrespective of throughput. To the shareholder lines^^ and 
certain big customers, concession rate is applied. It 
should be noted that the tariff is reviewed annually, in 
January. Negotiations with shipping lines on tariff 
increases are becoming more and more difficult. The 
reasons are that:-
(i) Lines' ability to pass on the incremental 
cost to their own customers is inhibited by 
the intensive competition in their market. 
Therefore, they are reluctant to accept the 
tariff increases even though the impact on 
freight revenue is minimal• Besides, lines 
believe that the longer time it takes to 
bargain with MTL, the lower the tariff 
/ increase will be, 
(ii) Benchmark tariff negotiations are 
traditionally held with the big customer 
lines, such as P&O and Maersk who are both 
the shareholders and users of MTL. Their 
The Peninsular and Orierital Steam Navigation Company 
L i m i t s (P&O) and Maersk Line are both the shareholders and users 
of MTL. 
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participation in the benchmark tariff 
negotiation will put the credibility in 
doubt. Other shipping lines are suspicious 
of the increases accepted by these two 
lines• 
MTL's major consideration is to secure a 
higher box as the box rate 
generates approximately 80% of the total 
operating income. The objective is to set 
up a constant formula which will be 
acceptable to the shipping lines so that 
negotiations can be simplified. Based on 
past experience, an increase in line with 
the inflation rate is not acceptable to the 
lines,* some lines even request a zero 
increase. However, it is very important to 
obtain an increase based on inflation level, 
even though such an increase may not fully 
cover for MTL the actual incraases in 
operating costs. 
Besides, MTL has tried to develop a tariff 
strategy designed to reflect the changing 
pattern of its business. The introduction 
of a 45' box rate is one example, and a 
2o "Box rate" refers to a standard tariff for a standard 
packag'e of services. It applies to all customer lines. 
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differential for non-PRC transhipment 
containers as a mean of increasing the rates 
is another. 
In summary, MTL's tariff strategy is to 
expand our sources of income and maintain as 
competitive a position as possible. 
4>3f3 WarK^t Sl^^re 
To maintain the market share is one of MTL objectives. 
MTL's share in Kwai Chung Port is 35% in 1991 • However, 
with the projection shown in Figure 6, it is revealed that 
MTL's market share will shrink from 40% in 1986 to 30% in 
1997. The shrinking of market share is due to the fact 
that expansion of capacity ie limited by the availability 
of facilities. MTL is faced with an under-capacity 
situation, while HIT has spare capacity. The outcoine is 
that new business will be absorbed by HIT. 
However, MTL's strategy is to maintain existing 
customer base. MTL does not compete with other terminal 
operators. The particular market segment MTL strives for 
is the one of quality customers with big potential. The 
performances of shipping lines are closely monitored, and 
MTL will plan for additional facilities to cater for their 
growth. The performances of major shipping lines from 1986 
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Kwai Chung Port Hong Kong Port 
Year — — 
MTL HIT Sealand MTL HIT Sealand 
1986 40% 45% 14% 32% 37% 12% 
1987 41% 45% 14% 31% 35% 11% 
1988 42% 44% 14% 32% 33% 11% 
1989 38% 48% 14% 29% 36% 10% 
1990 36% 50% 14% 27% 38% 10% 
199X 35% 53% 13% 26% 40% 10% 
•1992 32% 56% 12% 24% 42% 9% 
1993 31% 58% 12% 23% 44% 9% 
1994 30% 59% 11% 23% 45% 8% 
X995 30% 60% 10% 23% 45% 8% 
1996 30% 60% 10% 23% 45% 7% 
1997 30% 61% 9% 23% 46% 7% 
* Figures for 1992 and thereafter are estimated 
Figure 6 . _ 蘭 s m R P 
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to 1990 are shown in Figures 7 and 8 for reference. 
4•3•4• Customer Relationship 
MTL's strategy is to maintain a long-term relationship 
with its customers. Its golden rule is "be honest with our 
customers". It will not agree with the lines to something 
it cannot afford; it just tells them the truth. Overflows 
in 1988 before the acquiring of Terminal 2 can be cite<a as 
an example. Lines knew that MTL's capacity in that year 
could not meet their demands, and that Terminal 2 would 
only be available in early 1989. They accepted the need to 
overflow their boxes to either mid-stream operators or HIT. 
In return, whenever facilities are available, MTL tries its 
、 best to fulfil the requests of the shipping lines• 
In another sphere of customer relations, MTL's 
rela€lpnship with its PRC business associates needs to be 
more actively developed. The reasons are that:-
(x) Its PRC-relatea shipments are growing 
rapidly. In 1990, it accounted for 12% of 
MTI/s total container throughput. The 
ability of the lines to capture efficiently 
their share of the PRC trade through Hong 
Kong is therefore vital and an area where 
MTL can play an effective role. 
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1 • I>ERCENTAGE TO 
TOTAL ATEUS 
Maersk 39% 38% 39% 37% 34% 
ZIM 8% 8% 7% 9% 9% 
NYK 4% 6% 7% 8% 9% 
KLL 6% 7% 8% 8% 8% 
P&O 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 
HMM 2% 3% 4% 6% 6% 
HOL 5% 7% 6% 4% 4% 
HLC 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Others 27% 22% 19% 19% 20% 
TOTAL 100% X00% 100% 100% 100% 
2. PERCENTAGE TO 
LOCAL ATEUS 
Maersk 26% 25% 24% 22% 21% 
NYK 5% 8% X0% 9% 10% 
KLL 7% 9% X0% 1X% 10% 
HMM 2% 4% 5% 8% 8% 
ZIM 6% 7% 7% 7% 8% 
P&O 9% 9% 8% 8% a% 
MOL 6% 8% 8% 6% 5% 
HLC 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Others 34% 26% 24% 24% 26% 
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
3. PERCENTAGE TO 
TRANSHIPMENT ATEUS 
Maersk 69% 66% 68% 71% 67% 
ZIM XX% X0% 8% 12% 12% 
NYK 1% 2% 3% 4% 6% 
KLL 1% 3% 3% 2% 4% 
P&O 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
MOL 2% 5% 4% 1% 1% 
HLC X% 0% 1% X% 
HMM 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
Others 13% Xl% 9% 6% 6% 
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Figure 8. PF.RFQRMANCF OF MAJOR SHIPPING LINES SHARE OF 
TRUS H A K D I . F n KY MTL FROM YEAR 198^ TO 工990 
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(ii) Due to obvious political reasons, it is 
foreseeable that the influence of China will 
become more significant with time. The 
development of port facilities requires 
heavy capital outlays, and the participation 
of China-related investors will no doubt 
roinimise the risk of investment and 
encourage existing shareholders to invest 
more in this business. 
4-3-5 Other Business Opportunities 
Even though MTL is almost a pure terminal operator, it 
will not restrict itself only to the existing business. If 
there are other business opportunities related to this 
industry that seem worthy of investing, it will carefully 
study the feasibility of these projects and evaluate 
whether they can meet with its targeted return on 
x n v e s t m ^ t . The building of Warehouse Phase I in October 
1980 and Phase 工产 in August 1991 are some projects to 
diversify its business to other industries, and it will 
continue to seek other business opportunities whenever 
available. 
The main usage of MTL/s Warehouse Phases I and II are 
for leasing out to tenants for office and storage use, MTL only 
retains the ground and first floors for its Container Freight 
Station operations. 
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4.3.6 Company Image 
MTL is aware that company image is an intangible asset 
of the company. Therefore, one of MTL's marketing 
strategies is to build up our image as a good corporate 
citizen and also a responsible member of Kwai Chung and the 
Port Community• 
In this area, MTL actively participates in 
environiaental protection activities^^, such as re，cycling 
of waste paper, and the anti-pollution campaign. In the 
long run, it is very important to establish the company 
image because it can provide to the public a good 
perception of the company, and communication with other 
parties such as Government, pressure groups, etc. will be 
easier. It is also essential to project an image of MTL as 
being a responsible company and a good corporate citizen so 
to increase the confidence of its customers towards the 
company• 
All th6se marketing strategies of MTL are currently in 
use. Whether they can be implemented effectively and 
efficiently will depend on the tactics used to execute 
them, and on the influence of external market conditions• 
22 MTL was one of the member companies of the Private 
Sector Cominittee on the Environment which was 
• 警 • _ • 
1988. The members of this committee help improve the environment 
by contributing financially to the Committee or contribute 
expertise/services or both. 
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CHAPTKR V 
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
5,1 Research Results and Analysis 
After all the interviews with the shipping companies, 
their views can be summarized as follows:-
(i) Berthing space availability is most crucial 
to the efficient operations of the shipping 
lines. Queuing up for berths might cause 
the lines a chain delay in sailing schedule 
and hence sharply increase their operating 
costs. 
(ii) A lower tariff of terminal services would 
obviously be most welcome to the lines. In 
the highly competitive shipping business, 
profits can be easily be eaten up by over-
tonnage provision, high capital and 
operating costs^^ Tight control on 
expenditure is therefore essential- Thus 
23 A look into the 1989 financial figures of Hapag Lloyd, 
a German shipping company, tells a story. Although its container 
volumes revenues rose by 13% and 8% respectively, it had a 
deficit of DM20 million. Significant decline in rates and 12% 
increase in operating costs were the reasons for the loss. 
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Shipping lines prefer terminals with a 
competitive rat^, but with adequate berthing 
space to avoid waiting time and e^^tra 
maintenance cost, 
(iii) Adoption of advanced technology by the 
terminal to help shipping lines gear up 
their competitive edge is also essential. 
Efficiency of the handling equipment and in 
information exchange not only benefits the 
terminals, but also the shipping lines for 
attracting their own customers. 
Based on the above analysis, incorporated with the 
ideas from the MTL management (also through 
interviews), marketing strategies for Terminals 8 and 
9 are therefore reco細ended in the following sectipns 
of this chapter. 
Marketincr Objectives 
The throughput figure of 1.56 million TEU handled by 
MTL in X991 represented 34.5% of market share in the Kwai 
Chung Container Port, although it has only 28% of handling 
capacity in the area (Figure 9). 
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Year MTL HIT SEALAND TOTAL 
1991 1.6 3.5 0,6 5.7 
(28%) (61.5%) (10.5%) (100%) 
mid 2,5 4.4 0.6 7.5 
1993 
(33%) (59%) (8%) (X00%) 
mid 3,4 5.3 0.6 9.3 
1995 
(36.5%) (57%) (6.5%) (100%) 
Figure 9- HANDLING Capaptty IN KWAI CHUNG 
TN MTTXION TEUS 
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In order to fill up the additional capacity offered by 
the future terminals No. 8 and 9, MTL must formulate good 
mairketing strategies for attracting new jDUsiness, While 
the local rival HIT will occupy a predominantly 
advantageous position with its much more rapid expansion in 
berthing space, it would be unrealistic for MTL to set an 
over-ambitious marketing objective. There are, however, 
opportunities for MTL to increase its business volume by 
maximizing the use of its resources, catering to extra 
needs of its customers, adopting a more competitive pricing 
strategy and improviiK^ the service quality, to expand their 
services and gain extra revenue• The following objectives 
are proposed ;-
(i) Maintain the existing market share of 35% 
for the two years before and after Terminal 
8 coming on攀stream in mid 1993. 
(ii) Increase the market share to 40% in 1994• 
(iii) Increase the market share to 45% a year 
after Terminal 9 becomes operational in mid 
1995. 
(iv) Increase revenue by providing services 
related to container handling, e.g. land 
transportation, ,in-terminal packing / 
unpacking services and godown/ warehouse 
services• 、 
These related services, besides creating new business 
opportunities, also aid as attractive "ancillary services" 
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catering for the convenience of customers and consignees. 
These services can also decrease the hazards encountered by 
the customers such as missing the ship because of distant 
travel from warehouse to terminal and traffic congestion. 
5>3 Maintain Existing Customers and Market Share 
Based on tl:ie growth trend in throughput in Kwai Chung 
and the Stream during the past five years at average 
figures of 14% and 20% respectively, all terminals in Kwai 
Chung will still be very congested in the coming years. It 
is very likely MTL could maintain the existing customers in 
the coming two years. 
The expected shift of transhipment business of MTL's 
major customer, Maersk Line, away from Hong Kong to its new 
terminal in Kaohsiung will not necessarily be a dire 
negative, indeed it may be considered as a means of 
boosting the cost effectiveness of MTL's business since it 
will reduce the overflow from the terminals in the previous 
years. 
Although the Port of Singapore is developing rapidly, 
its location is far away from Hong Kong. It is 
geographically incompatible with Hong Kong and it plays a 
different role from Hong Kong Port in the Far East shipping 
routix^g. 
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As to the ports in Southern China, they are not likely 
to affect the role of Hong Kong Port in the near future. 
In about five years time. Hong Kong will be returned to 
China as one of the Special Economic Zones. The role of 
Hong Kong Port will of course depend very much on the 
Chinese government's port policy• As port facilities have 
already been well-established h窃re, together with the 
advantageous geographical location supported by the huge 
industrial base and equipped with modern communication 
facilities, the importance of Hong Kong Port is expected to 
be maintainecj after 1997. When considering the Pearl River 
Delta as a whole rather than Hong Kong separately, ports in 
the region will serve as feeder ports to support rather 
than compete with Hong Kong Port in this decade. 
It is therefore expected that before the inception of 
Terminal 8, MTL would not lose much of its business either 
to local rivals or to other ports in the nearby countries. 
MTL's strategy lies on how to maintain a service level with 
good quality for its existing core customers (Appendix E)• 
Exiatiina Customer Base 
Apart from maintaining a good service level, 
individual customers should be closely monitored. Their 
business growth and new developments have to be considered, 
their potential to explore new services should not be 
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neglected, and their new requirements have to be attended 
to. 
MTL should try its very best to cater for individual 
needs, like dredging the seabed to provide deeper draught 
for the 4th generation post-Panamax vessels which at 
present can not berth at MTL because of its big size and 
deep draught requirement. Business represented by these 
vessels will easily be lost to a competitor who possesses 
terminals with deeper draught if MTL does not take any 
action at all. 
5-5 Increase Yard Capacity 
Ability to increase the yard capacity is essential in 
providing quality service as well as attracting new 
customers. There are several ways to increase yard 
capacity:-
(i) Acquire off-site depots and terminals 
Efforts should, be made to acquire off-site 
depots in the vicinity of the terminals. 
These depots will provide more space for 
storage of containers and hence increase in 
capacity of the company. 
Off—site terminals such as those in Shekou 
and Shenzhen can be leased as backup 
53 
terminal facilities. As a large portion of 
containers coining to and from Hong Kong 
originate from China, import and export 
delivery ana collection of these boxes can 
be extended to ports in these areas by 
barges• 
Shekou is particularly favourable for this 
purpose because of its approaching fairway 
passing through Hong Kong water, non-
existence of silting, low labour costs and 
a better competitive environment. 
This will therefore not only be a cost 
effective measure to MTL but also a 
favourable scheme to its customers. 
However, its feasibility alX depends on 
Chinese government's port policy and much 
time and effort will be required to 
"engineer" its success. 
(ii) High Density Container Handling System 
one way to increase the terminal throughput 
is to increase the stacking capacity while 
at the same time maintain a quality service 
level. As the terminal is always subject to 
land constraints in Hong Kong, the only 
solution is to increase the space 
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utilization by using higher stacking 
machines / systems. In the medium term, 
machinery which can stack up more tiers of 
box, such as the Rubber-tyred Gantry crane 
of 4-high^^ should be purchased to replace 
the existing Straddle Carrier of S-high. 
For the longer term, there are other even 
higher stacking structures / machines such 
as coroputainer, superstacker, silo, etc, 
available for consideration. 
To enable the above to work and be able to 
maintain the service level at the same time, 
a certain degree of automation is required. 
A more automated system will also help 
sharpen the competitive edge of MTL against 
its local and foreign competitors, as well 
as keep pace with the international 
technology advancement. 
5.6 Information Technology 
Advanced information technology should be developed to 
speed up the information exchange process. This is 
24 "4-high" refers to those machinery which can stack up 
four tiers of containers. 
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particularly helpful in increasing the efficiency and 
saving manpower in MTL, since a large amount of paper 
documents are generated each day in the company for 
operations and record purposes. Many of these papers have 
to be transmitted to the shipping customers as well as for 
interchanging necessary information. Hence developing 
information technology will not only beneficial to MTL 
itself but also its customers. 
MTL has already started developing Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) over the last three years^®. The 
objective is to link up the computer networks of shipping 
lines with that of MTL in order to speed up information 
exchange between the both parties. However only Zim Line, 
an Israeli customer, has devoted full support to this 
development and has begun implementation for over a year. 
Other lines are still studying the technology with 
reservations. Progress has been slow. The reasons for the 
lines being not ready for this technology are the 
requirement for changing a large extent of their existing 
computer programmes and even operations systems, involving 
heavy capital expenditures. Much effort has to be put in 
promoting EDI's benefits and its long term cost saving so 
to quicken the development. 
25 MTL is one of the founders among firms in the 
consortium which funded the Tradelink Document Services Ltd. to 
pioneer the development of EDI in Hong Kong. 
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Apart from EDI, incorporation of the Just-In-Time 
concept in the information exchange process is worth a 
study. JIT will surely help further enhance the work 
efficiency and minimize the inventory level in the 
terminal. 
5.7 Competitive Pricing 
By adopting a combination of various pricing 
strategies for different services, it is hoped to retain 
the existing customers and to attract new customers. 
For existing berthing and cargo handling services, the 
present price will be maintained as it is already 
competitive when compared to its competitors• 
A differentiated tariff structure can be adopted to 
encourage weekday berthing. Weekend tariff rates can be 
priced against HIT since at weekends, berthings always 
overflow and saturate all terminal facilities* On the 
other hand, a lower rate specially for weekday berthing 
will help attract shipping lines with unusual routings or 
to encourage them to alter their usual routings to take 
advantage of the weekday tariff- Lower rates can also 
attract those small shipping companies, which at present 
are using mid-stream operations for its low cost, to 
approach the teritiinal. 
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Volume discount is another method to attract business 
especially from those big shipping companies who have 
bigger vessels calling at Hong Kong- This will on one hand 
attract more business, and on the other increase the 
operations efficiency since the average turn-around time 
for fewer big vessels are shorter than for more small 
vessels due to the fact that less time will be taken for 
vessels' berthing and departing the terminal. 
Other concessions can also be granted to ma jof 
customers by the same token as volume discount. However, 
all these measures have to be taken carefully in order not 
to antagonize other customers. 
Another area that could be looked into for pricing 
below the market are those shipping services in the 
northeast Asian region. Demand for this so-called Intra-
Asian or coastal services has been rapidly increasing in 
the recent years. This Intra-Asian trade had risen by 13% 
in 1991 over the previous year, echoing the growing 
economic strength of the region. Opportunities apparently 
lie in whether the terminal operators can be nimble enough 
to catch this expanding business. A lower coastal rate 
specially designed for these intra-Asian services can be 
implemented to attract those shipping customers who are 
getting involved in this trend. 
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5*8 Cost Strategy 
Just adopting a lower pricing strategy will do no good 
to the company profits. An effective cost strategy must 
also be implemented at the same time so as to maintain, if 
not increase, the profit level of the company. Operating 
costs have to be contained, manning has to be re-evaluated 




CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Strategies recommended in the previous chapter are 
strategies not only a卯lying to Terminals 8 and 9, but in 
fact to the wlxole company. The two future terminals will 
not be separate entities from the existing terminals. 
Operations will be incorporated together to obtain the 
maximum efficiency. 
6-1 Control 
Wtiile only time will tell the real practicality of 
these suggested marketing means, it is vital to note before 
their implementation that their success lies in the 
existence of an effective control measure. Control in both 
the expenditures and the results are important- The basic 
principle for this marketing plan is not to incur too heavy 
a cost as to have any negative impacts on the pricing 
strategies put forward. 
To monitor results, comparison between the expected 
performance with the actual performance at certain pre-^ 
designed periods, say every three months, is required to 
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allow necessary corrective actions to be taken in time. 
For instance, if after three months, the growth of 
throughput is running at a rate lower than the one required 
to achieve the target market share, the marketing mix and 
marketing plans should, then be reassessed by asking 
questions such as : Is the price still too high? Is the 
efficiency too low? After the answers are obtained, 
strategies might have to be adjusted to suit the real 
situation. It is through a process of evaluate, adjust, 
re-evaluate and re-adjust that the strategies will finally 
come close to reality• 
6,2 Uncertainties 
No matter how buttoned-down any plan may be, there are 
some uncertainties which are out of the control of any 
company. The marketing plan suggested in this report is no 
exception• 
(i) Legislative Uncertainty 
Although the government has finally 
confirmed the location of Terminal 9 on 
south East Tsing Yi, it has not decided in 
what way the terminal facility will be 
granted. There are of course chances that 
MTL will not be able to obtain the operation 
right of Terminal 9 • whether it is granted 
by public open tender or private treaty• If 
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MTL fails to do so, it will not have 
sufficient capacity to achieve the targeted 
marketing strategies. 
(ii) Political Uncertainty 
With 1997 approaching shortly, political 
uncertainty presents the number one question 
mark to the company. Although both the 
Chinese and British governments have striven 
to promote stability and prosperity in the 
territory, there are still chances of 
political unrest or drastic changes in 
policy when one decision-maker is changed 
for another, 
(iii) Environmental Uncertainty 
The environmental uncertainty here mainly 
refers to the availability of additional 
land for off-site depots in the future 
years, since land is so scarce in Hong Kong, 
Every piece of land when available will be 
competed for various uses. This is 
especially true in Kwai Chung area where 
land supply is always a problem to a variety 
of industries including container related 
back-up services, factories, residential 
building and public utilities. The terminal 
might not be able or have the priority in 
62 
obtaining land for increasing capacity. 
The increasing concern of environmental 
problems also poses some threats to the 
further development around the temiinals. 
CoiRmunity people are very vocal these days 
in expressing their objection against 
building of container terminal facilities in 
the vicinity of residential areas, lest 
their living environment be worsened by the 
various nuisances produced by the industry. 
These protests will more or less hinder the 
business development of the terminal* 
While some of these uncertainties can be minimized 
through lobbying with the government and building better 
relations with the community, some are really out of the 
control of any terminal operator• However, MTL should keep 
a close watch at the dynamic environment around and be 
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APPENDIX C 
NOTES & MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Throughput projection is based on a regression analysis of 
annual throughput of Hong Kong and the corresponding Hong 
Kong Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the last twelve years 
from 1979 to 1990. Graph A represents the relationship of 
GDP with H.K. annual throughput and Graph B shows the line 
of best fit between these two indicators• 
2. The estimated GDP figures from 1991 to 1997 are extracted 
from the following sources 
a. Year 1991 to 1995 - latest estimates from the 3rd 
quarter 1991 of the Global Forecasting Service of 
Business International (Table A)• 
b . Year 1996 to 1997 based on latest 5-year moving 
average of GDP growth• 
3. An adjustment is made for year 1992 due to the fact that 
Maersk Line will transfer approximately 210,000 ATEUS to 
Kaohsiung, Taiwan. As a result, Hong Kong Port will suffer 
a loss of 210,000 ATEUs in 1992, and the loss is assumed to 
be fully absorbed by MTL. 
4. It assumed that during the projection period, there will 
not be any overwhelming changes in global economic and 
political conditions. 
5. Terminal facilities in Hong Kong can cope with the 
anticipated demand, Bach terminal operator will maintain 
their market share up to their workable capacity, and 
overflows ar台 allowed amongst terminals‘ 
6. Based on the above assumptions, table and figures are 
projected as follows:-
A4 
Table B states the estiinate<J throughput handled by Hong 
Kong Port, Kwai Chung port, mid-stream and the three 
terminal operators, MTL, HIT and Sea-Lanci. 
Figure 3 shows the estimated capacity share and the 
estimated market share of MTL, HIT and Sea-Land. A 
corresponding revised market share is worked out assuming 
that once the operating capacity is saturated, excess 
overflows will be directed to other terminal facilities. 
If Terminal 9 is not assumed, container terminal facilities 
of Kwai Chung Port will be filled up in year 1996. 
Figure 5 presents the estimated operating capacity of the 
three terminal operators, up to Terminal 8 only, and the 
projected utilization rate. If the utilization rate is 
over 100%, overflows to other facilities are assumed. 
Figure 6 is the estimated market share of the three 
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m m m m m m 
Real growth p.a.) 
SDP 2.4 3.6 6.2 4.8 3.6 2.8 
Private consumption 4.2 4.5 7.5 6.0 4.5 3.0 
Govemaent consunption 7.6 6.0 6,0 5,5 5.0 4.5 
Gross fixed investkent 6.4 7,0 lo.o 6.3 4.6 4.0 
Exports 8.8 15.3 15.2 13.3 9.8 6.9 
Iiports 11.2 16.9 16,7 13.6 9.B 7.0 
Change in stocks (I of GDP) U 2.1 2,8 2.2 1.3 o,9 
Population and Income 
GDP (US$ billion) 70.1 81.2 94.4 109.8 125.1 140.2 
_ a t i o n (million) 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 
GDP per head (US$ '000) 12.1 13.9 16.1 18.7 21.3 23.8 
Inflation (I p.a.) 
Consumer prices 9,8 12.0 9.5 11.0 10.0 9.0 
Average wages in iianufacturing {HK$ per day) 161.7 182.7 203.7 230.2 254.2 278.5 
Financial indicators 
E x c _ rate (HK$ per US$) 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7,8 
Comiercial ba他 prime rate (yearend, I) 10,0 8.5 9.0 9.5 8.5 8.5 
External trade (0S5 billion) 
Merchandise exports 82.2 9U 116.5 141,7 162.5 180.3 
Merchandise imports -82.8 -101.0 -120.3 -145.0 -165.4 -183.2 
Trade balance * -0.7 -2.3 -3.8 -3.3 -2.9 -2.9 
Services exports 13.8 15.6 17.9 20.7 22.8 24.5 
Services iaports -9.3 ^lO.a -12.9 -14.5 -16.1 -17.5 
Services balance * 4,5 4.7 5.0 6.2 6.7 7.0 
Goods & services balance * 3.8 2.4 1.2 2,9 3.8 4.1 
as \ of GDP 5.4 3.0 1.3 2.6 3.0 2.9 
Foreign indebtedness 
Kediin & long-tem 妯t 
Total m billion) 5.2 5.4 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.6 
D敝 service ratio ⑷ 1.8 U U 1.3 U i.l 
* Totals nay not add due to rounding 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Performance of terminal operators in 1990 
mh Ell Sealand 
TEU handled (thousands) 1,371 1,930 530 
Quay length (metres) 1,082 3,292 305 
Area (hectares) 52 89 17 
Stacking capacity (TEU) 26,497 55,770 5,232 
a. TEU per quay length 1,267 586 1,738 
b . TEU per area 26,365 21,685 31,176 
c. TEU per stacking capacity 51-7 34.6 101.3 
2. MTL performance indicators 
19^9 1990 
operational Statistics 
a. TEU handled including 
overflows (thousands) 1,275 1,276 1,371 
b. TEU handled in MTL 
(thousands) 1,172 1,269 1,371 
c . overflows (thousands) 103 7 律 
d. Quay length (metres) 777 1,082 1,082 
e. Area (hectares) 42 51 52 
f. Stacking capacity (TEU) 20,630 26,011 26,497 
g. No, of quay cranes 8 10 11 
h . No. of movements excluding 
HIT mici-stream overflows 
(thousands) 820 876 931 
i. Ratio of 20' box to 40' box 1.374 1.247 1-137 
3. Performance indicators 
a, TEU per quay length 1,509 1,172 1,267 
b . TEU per area 27,909 24.873 26,370 
C . TEU per quay cranes 145,069 129,046 124,660 
d. TEU per stacking capacity 56.8 48,8 Sl.B 
e. container moves per crane 101,508 89,076 84,596 
f. Berth utilization 。 
Weekend 87.1% 76.4% 75-7% 
Weekday 86.0% 65,4% 64.5% 
Monthly 86,4% 72.2% 69-3% 
i / \ / J 、、 
CHINA MERCHANTS CONTAINER ； / ； ^ ; 
LINES LTD. - ^ •：> 
CHINA NATIONAL CHARTERING 、 , ； 
CORPORATION ‘ 、 i 
CHINA NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE 
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION 
(BEIJING) 
CHINA NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE P & O CONTAINER LINE 韓 _現代商船株式會社 
TRANSPpRTATION CORPORATION 
(JIANGSU) SOUTH AFRICA CONTAINER CLUB 江4{者海運公司 
KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA LTD. 
CHU KONG SHIPPING CO., LTD. MITSUI O.S.K. LINE "liAV^ Aattj^ Au 
\EDLLOYD LINES 
EAC TRANSPACIFIC SERVICE NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA 
SOUTH AFRICAN MARINE 馬士基輪船 
EAST ASIA AUSTRALIA CONSORTIUM CORPORATION 
CONFERENCE SERVICE 助由JfiiJ&i费电 
ASIA AUSTRALIA CONTAINER SERVICE TIENTSIN MARINE SHIPPING CO. ^ J ^ S S l 
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL LINE .^X^Jffl^ 
KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA LTD. TOKYO SENPAKU KAISHA LTD. 大阪商船三并船舶株式會社 
MITSUI O.S.K. LINE • 日本郵船株式會社 
NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA WEST AUSTRALIA SERVICE 
YANG MING LINE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL LINE 由亩航溢 
KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA LTD. ZT^ L^-t&isA-i^  
FAR EAST ENTERPRISING CO., (HK) KNUTSEN LINE 
LTD MITSUI O.S.K. LINE 阿拉fe國'豕聯合輪船公i] 
NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA • 成廉遍 
G O L D STAR LINE 
ZIM CONTAINER SERVICE 女K核胁二 才舍lif 
HAPAG LLOYD AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 人 — 开册«抹式曾tt 
ZIM EILAT AUSTRALIA LINE 
H O N G K O N G MING W A H SHIPPING 海望船務公口 1 
CO LTD ZIM FAR EAST ADRIATIC LINE 
紐約航速 
H O N G K O N G - PHILIPPINES SERVICE : :伴船舶株式畲社 
溫^TRqAR^丁o【J"NSEYSS™ 局貨播航連細公口 1 日本郵船株式會杜 
HYUNDAI MERCHANT MARINE CO. 中M租船公司 f丨本邦船株式會社 
LTD. 
lIAMrcinMARINF QHTPPINC CO 中«對外貿易速鍮總公…丨北京） 綠洲 «彻快航 JIANGSU MARINE SHIPPING CO. 丨丨|崎广(^ !^ |殊式會社 
KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA LTD. 中W對外貿娱連輪總公口1 (丨「蘇i 丨：牛船舶殊式會社 
[1十：郛船f；!：式台处 
MAERSK CONTAINER LINE 珠汗.船務有限公 »^1 w ll丨j限公j 
MEDITERRANEAN AND FAR EAST ^ r s 箱 速 钉 圾 公 " 1 
CONTAINER SERVICE 寳降太平洋航緑 ffi^auWAU 
LLOYD TRIESTINO 上 „ . 
MITSUI O.S.K. LINE 東亞澳船公會集闻 由 
NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA 亞澳箱運航線 川崎fl船株式會社 
^.lnnfPFA^T^FRVI^F 澳洲國 i線 商船三牛船舶殊式會社 
UNITED ARAB SHIPPING CO. (SAG) 大阪商船二并船舶株式會社 日本卸IF未穴离‘丨,上 
WILHELMSEN LINES 日本郵船株式會社 南非國‘豕裸 
陽明,海運股份丨i•限公司 ， 
MITSUI O.S.K. LINE 人fP山-海迷公口 1 
NEPTUNE ORIENT LINES 肺 P T 如 � 贼 績 株 式 會 社 
NEW YORK CONTAINER SERVICE 金 iJi輪船公… 
MITSUI O.S.K. LINE 西澳洲航線 
NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA 赫伯羅德輪船有限公司 澳i)丨翻家線 
川崎f (•船株式會社 
NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA … ^ IZ VIT-TCCM I ivit 
香港明華船務有跟公司 K‘\U了SEN U:\£ 
OASIS CONTAINER EXPRESS LINES 大阪商船三并船舶株式會巾土 
KAWASAKI KISEN KAISHA LTD. 香港一菲律賓航線 日本郵船株式會吐 
MITSUI O.S.K. LINE T-irtlt/f 
NIPPON YUSEN KAISHA 以ffi航運冇限公司 
P&OCONTAINERUNE it^  T^.Mbf力—"J 
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